Representative Sampling Equilibrium

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Abstract

We present an equilibrium concept based on the idea that agents evaluate actions using sample data drawn from the equilibrium distribution, where the number of observations about an alternative is proportional to its usage in a relevant population. Agents naively extrapolate from their data, using the sample mean payoff from each alternative as a predictor of their payoff from choosing it. The endogeneity of sample sizes gives rise to a novel equilibrium effect: Players’ assessment of less frequently played actions is noisier. We study the implications of this effect in a single-agent, binary-choice model, as well as in various examples of games.

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1 Introduction

Standard analysis of long-run behavior in single- or multi-agent decision problems assumes that agents act as if they know the long-run statistical regularities in their environment. How players get to learn these regularities is left outside the scope of analysis and relegated to separate models of learning (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998) in the context of games), which focus on players’ dynamic responses to finitely many observations of past outcomes.

In the context of strategic decision making, a small literature — starting with Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), and including Spiegler (2006a,b), Salant and Cherry (2020) and Goncalves (2020) — has attempted to fuse these two approaches by formulating game-theoretic equilibrium concepts in which learning from finite samples is intrinsic to equilibrium behavior. Players base their actions on some kind of inference from samples that are drawn from the equilibrium distribution, which in turn is determined by their own response to these samples. Equilibrium behavior is intrinsically random due to sampling errors.

Equilibrium concepts in this vein are based on fundamental assumptions regarding the procedures players employ when forming their sample and drawing inferences from it. In particular, the choice of sampling procedure depends on the type of learning one wishes to capture: Are agents learning from active experimentation or from passive observation?

Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Salant and Cherry (2020) assumed uniform sampling, where each player samples each action $K$ times (more precisely, she draws $K$ independent sample points from each action’s conditional outcome distribution). This uniform sampling procedure naturally fits situations in which players rely on deliberate experimentation to form beliefs. It is less appropriate as a description of situations in which players’ equilibrium perceptions are based on passive, casual observational data. For example, consider a decision between two smartphone brands (in the absence of consumption externalities, this decision is non-strategic). To learn about
the quality of each brand, an agent might ask some of her friends to report their experiences with their current devices. In this case, her sample size for each brand will depend on its popularity among her friends.

To capture this kind of sampling-based decisions, we extend the Osborne-Rubinstein approach by assuming that each player’s sample is not uniform but representative. In the simplest case of a single-agent choice problem, the decision maker constructs a sample of size $n$, such that the number of sample points about a given action $a$ is $n \cdot q(a)$, where $q(a)$ is the frequency with which the action is taken in the population. Thus, the decision maker will gather more sample points about actions that are played more frequently.

As in Osborne and Rubinstein (1998), we assume that players draw naive frequentist inferences from their sample — that is, they treat the sample average as a predictor of the outcome they will get from each action, neglecting sampling error. This kind of over-inference from finite samples is related to the phenomenon that Tversky and Kahneman (1971) called “the law of small numbers”. The idea that people take sample averages at face value and inadequately incorporate sample size has received corroboration both in experimental settings (e.g., Orbrecht et al. (2007)) and in studies of users’ response to online reviews (e.g., de Langhe et al. (2016)).

A representative sampling equilibrium (RSE) in an extensive-form game is a profile of behavioral strategies that are consistent with this sampling procedure. That is, at every information set, the probability that the player takes the action $a$ is the probability that it will have the best performance in the relevant representative sample.

The representative-sample assumption can be taken literally, modeling a form of experimentation in which players deliberately ensure that the composition of their sample matches the relevant population, in the manner of political pollsters. Our favored interpretation, however, regards the representative sample assumption as a modeling approximation of more passive, observational learning. In the smartphone story described above, agents
base their decision on a random sample of their peers. Directly modeling a random-sample procedure would be more realistic, yet far less tractable; representative sampling is an approximation that makes the model tractable while preserving the feature that frequently played actions are sampled more often.

In line with this modeling strategy, we also assume that the signal the decision maker gets about an action from a single sample point is a normally distributed variable, whose mean and variance are those of the equilibrium conditional outcome distribution associated with this action. In some settings, this normality assumption is not an approximation but follows automatically from the model’s primitives. In others (e.g., games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma), normality is an approximation that addresses the problem that \( n \cdot q(a) \) need not be an integer.

The modeling approximations of representative samples and normal variables constitute a methodological contribution of this paper: They enable tractable analysis of sampling-based equilibrium behavior in a variety of complex environments. Moreover, as we will see, non-trivial equilibrium effects persist even when \( n \) takes values for which these approximations are relatively accurate.

The basic insight of this paper is that since the sample size of each action depends on its popularity in the relevant population, it is endogenous and thus gives rise to a novel equilibrium effect. Even in a single-agent decision problem, the evaluation of a given action \( a \) will depend on its choice frequency \( q(a) \), because the frequency affects the variance of the sample’s outcome distribution; this variance in turn affects the probability with which the agent chooses \( a \), which in equilibrium coincides with \( q(a) \). This equilibrium effect is new to the literature on sampling-based solution concepts.

Revisiting our smartphone example, assume that smartphone \( A \) is objectively inferior to smartphone \( B \). If a consumer were able to fully assess the brands’ quality levels before making her purchase decision, she would
choose $B$. However, when she bases her decision on a representative sample of her peers, she may decide to purchase $A$ due to sampling error. Since $A$ is objectively inferior, it is less likely to be chosen and therefore the sample will contain fewer observations of $A$ users. As a result, the consumer’s estimate of the quality of $A$ will be noisier. Since a noisy assessment favors an objectively inferior alternative, it introduces an equilibrium effect that magnifies the choice frequencies of objectively inferior actions, compared with the choice frequencies under a uniform sample.

The observation that naive inference from representative samples introduces an equilibrium force that favors inferior alternatives is a key message of this paper. We explore its ramifications in various settings. In Sections 2 and 3 we present and analyze a simple model of binary choice, in which a consumer’s underlying objective valuation of actions is a function of her private type. The same alternative is objectively superior for all consumer types. Thus, the only difference between types is in the intensity of this objective preference. The decision maker’s representative sample is drawn from the population of consumers.

We define RSE for this environment and obtain existence, uniqueness, and monotonicity results for RSE in this binary-choice model. Our main finding for this model concerns the dependence of equilibrium choice probabilities on sample size. The basic insight described above implies that not only does the representative sample assumption increase the equilibrium frequency of the inferior alternative relative to the rational or uniform-sample cases, but the rate with which this frequency vanishes with $n$ is extremely slow.

We also consider an extension of this binary-choice model, in which the set of types is partitioned into “intervals”, such that each type’s sample is restricted to the interval that includes it. This extension captures situations in which the decision maker only receives data about similar types. We carry out comparative statics with respect to the coarseness of the partition. In particular, we show that when the objective payoff difference between the
two alternatives is not too large, a finer partition leads to a higher overall equilibrium probability of choosing the objectively inferior alternative.

In Section 4, we present the more general formulation of RSE for games, and illustrate it with the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, in Section 5 we extend the representative-sample idea to encompass the situation in which the agent takes her action. While our main model assumes that players’ total sample size is \( n \) for every information set, here we assume that it is proportional to the information set’s equilibrium frequency: More frequent situations generate more sample points. This version is even closer to the idea of samples that are drawn from passive observation as opposed to active experimentation. It also introduces an additional layer of sample-size endogeneity, because the frequency of information sets is determined in equilibrium. We illustrate this extension with an infinite-horizon trust game and show how it leads to endogenous patterns of reciprocity, which are impossible under the original concept.

Related literature
As mentioned above, this paper builds on a literature that incorporates learning from finite samples into the definition of equilibrium concepts in games. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) introduced the concept of \( S(K) \) equilibrium, in which each player samples each available strategy \( K \) (independent) times and chooses the best-performing strategy in her sample. Osborne and Rubinstein (2003) study a variant on this concept (in the context of a voting model), in which each player best-replies to a finite sample drawn from her opponents’ strategies. Spiegler (2006a,b) studied price competition models in which consumers evaluate products using the \( S(K) \) procedure.

Osborne and Rubinstein (1998, 2003) assumed that players regard their sample as a noiseless estimate of the distribution from which it is drawn. This is what we referred to as “naive frequentist” inference, which this paper assumes as well. Salant and Cherry (2020) extended the sampling-based equilibrium approach to a more general class of statistical inference proce-
dures, and proposed Bernstein polynomials as a tool for analyzing equilibria in certain classes of games. Unlike the present paper, Salant and Cherry (2020) maintained Osborne and Rubinstein’s assumption that sample size is an exogenous parameter.

Goncalves (2020) formulated an equilibrium concept for games, based on a sequential sampling procedure. Each player has a prior distribution over the opponents’ strategies, and she uses rational sequential sampling to gather more accurate information about them. The player stops sampling before she attains certainty, due to sampling costs; this is what generates random equilibrium behavior.

Our model is also related to the literatures on word-of-mouth learning (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) or Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)) and the role of homophily in learning in social networks (e.g., Golub and Jackson (2012)). Unlike this paper, both literatures involve explicitly dynamic models. Like us, Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) assume that the process of social learning involves representative samples. However, they assume that agents draw Bayesian inferences from noisy observations of their predecessors’ payoffs (as well as their observed choices). Another distinction between our paper and these earlier works is that agents in our model do not draw any inferences from alternatives’ relative popularity as such; popularity affects choice behavior only through the sample-size channel.

2 A Single-Agent Binary Choice Model

An agent is facing a choice between two alternatives, denoted $A$ and $B$. The agent’s type is $t \in T$, where $T \subset \mathbb{R}$ is a finite set. Let $\mu \in \Delta(T)$ represent a distribution over types in a large population of agents facing the same choice problem. Denote the fraction of type $t$ in the population by $\mu_t$. The agent’s objective expected payoff from choosing an alternative $z \in \{A, B\}$ given her type $t \in T$ is $u(z, t)$.
Let $q_t(z)$ be the probability that agents of type $t$ choose $z$. The average frequency of choosing $z$ in the population is

$$\bar{q}(z) = \sum_{t \in T} \mu_t q_t(z)$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

We will often use the abbreviated notation $q_t = q_t(B)$ and $\bar{q} = \bar{q}(B)$.

In our model, $q_t$ is a consequence of agents’ attempt to learn their payoffs from samples. An agent’s total sample size is a positive integer $n$. The agent’s estimate of $u(z, t)$ is independently and normally distributed as follows:

$$\hat{u}(z, t) \sim N\left(u(z, t), \frac{\sigma^2}{n\bar{q}(z)}\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $\sigma^2 > 0$ is the payoff variance of a sample point from any alternative.

**Definition 1** A profile $(q_t)_{t \in T}$ is a **representative-sampling equilibrium (RSE)** if for every $t \in T$,

$$q_t = \Pr(\hat{u}(B, t) - \hat{u}(A, t) > 0)$$

where this probability is calculated according to (2).

The idea behind this formulation is as follows. Before choosing an action, an agent of type $t$ samples the payoff realizations of each alternative. The alternatives’ representation in her sample matches their choice frequencies among the types in the population. The agent is a “naive frequentist”, who takes sample outcomes at face value. That is, she regards the sample average $\hat{u}(z, t)$ as an accurate representation of her underlying average payoff from choosing $z$, ignoring sampling error.

The assumption that $\hat{u}(z, t)$ is normally distributed can be interpreted literally — i.e., every sample point is objectively drawn from a normal distribution. Alternatively, the assumption can be viewed as a modeling ap-
proximation. That is, the objective distribution of each sample point is not necessarily normal, yet the central limit theorem allows us to approximate the distribution of the sample average by a suitable normal distribution. This alternative interpretation will be more pertinent in later sections.

By the assumption that \( \hat{u}(A, t) \) and \( \hat{u}(B, t) \) are independent normal variables,

\[
\hat{u}(B, t) - \hat{u}(A, t) \sim N \left( u(B, t) - u(A, t), \frac{\sigma^2}{n\bar{q}(A)q(B)} \right)
\]

Therefore, we can identify \( t \) with the mean of this distribution — i.e.,

\[
t = u(B, t) - u(A, t)
\]

such that \( t \) measures the agent’s underlying intrinsic preference for \( B \) over \( A \). Furthermore, it is clear from (3) that the value of \( \sigma \) can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality (because we can rescale \( t \)). Therefore, from now on we set \( \sigma = 1 \).

Consequently, the equilibrium condition can be rewritten as

\[
q_t = Pr \left[ N \left( 0, \frac{1}{n\bar{q}(1-q)} \right) < t \right]
\]

for all \( t \), or, equivalently,

\[
q_t = \Phi \left( t\sqrt{n\bar{q}(1-q)} \right)
\]

where \( \Phi \) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution (we invoke this notation consistently throughout the paper).

We will use (4) as our working definition of RSE in Section 3. This definition immediately implies that in any RSE, an agent of type \( t \) chooses her objectively superior alternative (i.e., the \( z \) with the higher \( u(z, t) \)) with probability greater than \( \frac{1}{2} \). It is not surprising that due to sampling errors, the inferior alternative is also chosen with positive probability.
When $\bar{q}(z) = 0$, $\hat{u}(z, t)$ is ill-defined because it involves infinite variance. To handle this, we treat $N(0, \infty)$ as a well-defined distribution satisfying $\Pr(x \leq c) = \frac{1}{2}$ for every $c$. Consequently, the definition of RSE given by (4) is legitimate even when $\bar{q}(z) = 0$. Equilibrium choice probabilities will always be interior.

Yet, how big are agents’ choice errors? A central theme of this paper is that naive-frequentist inference from representative samples magnifies the probability of errors. Specifically, when the average choice distribution is skewed (i.e., when $\bar{q}$ is close to zero or one), the variance of $\hat{u}(B, t) - \hat{u}(A, t)$ is large, and this introduces an equilibrium counter-force toward a less skewed distribution, namely larger choice errors. Section 3 will explore the implications of this force.

*Comment: What do agents observe?*

The definition of $\hat{u}(z, t)$ given by (2) implies that although each agent learns from the outcomes of other people’s choices, the mean of her noisy signal is $u(z, t)$, where $t$ is the agent’s own type. In other words, an agent of type $t$ observes an unbiased noisy signal of the payoff that she herself would get from a particular action.

Our main interpretation of this assumption is that the agent observes the full consequences of the choices of the people in her sample. Using our smartphone example from the Introduction, an agent’s sample point consists of the full experience that a friend of hers had with his chosen brand. Since this experience contains random elements, it is a noisy signal of the agent’s own payoff from the brand. However, our agent does not draw inferences from her friend’s mere choice (as would be the case in social-learning models in the tradition of Bikchandani et al. (1992)) or his subjective assessment of the product.

An alternative interpretation is that $u(z, t) = v(z) + t$, such that $v$ is a common-payoff component which agents learn via sampling, whereas $t$ is an idiosyncratic payoff component that each agent knows and does not need
to learn from observations. For instance, $v$ may represent restaurant quality while $t$ represents the relative distance of the two restaurants from the agent’s location. Since $v$ is common to all agent types, we can assume that agents learn their friends’ subjective satisfaction with their choices, even without observing their complete experiences.

3 Analysis

We begin our analysis with a few elementary results.

Remark 1 An RSE exists.

Remark 2 Let $q$ be an RSE. If $t' > t$, then, $q_{t'} > q_t$.

Both results are immediate consequences of (4). This equation defines a fixed point of a continuous mapping from $[0, 1]^{|T|}$ to itself. Such a fixed point exists, by Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. Furthermore, fixing an equilibrium $q$, the R.H.S of (4) is strictly increasing in $t$, and therefore $q_t$ must increase in $t$.

The following result establishes equilibrium uniqueness when $B$ is the intrinsically superior alternative for all agent types.

Proposition 1 Assume $t > 0$ for every $t \in T$. Then, there is a unique RSE.

Proof. Assume towards contradiction that $q = (q_t)_{t \in T}, q' = (q'_t)_{t \in T}$ are both RSE solutions and $q \neq q'$. Let $t$ satisfy $q_t \neq q'_t$ for some $t \in T$. Then, by (4), $q' \neq \bar{q}$. Assume without loss of generality that $\bar{q} > q'$. Since $t > 0$ for every $t \in T$, we have $q_t, q'_t > \frac{1}{2}$ for every $t \in T$ and hence $\bar{q} > q' > \frac{1}{2}$. This implies $\bar{q}(1 - \bar{q}) < q'(1 - q')$. Thus, for all $t \in T$,

$$q_t = \Phi \left( t \sqrt{nq(1 - \bar{q})} \right) < \Phi \left( t \sqrt{n\bar{q}'(1 - q')} \right) = q'_t$$
Hence,
\[
\bar{q} = \sum_{t \in T} \mu_t q_t(z) < \sum_{t \in T} \mu_t q'_t(z) = \bar{q}'
\]
a contradiction. ■

Finding conditions for equilibrium uniqueness when the sign of \( t \) is not constant is an open problem.

3.1 Convergence Properties

Consider the case of a single agent type, \( T \equiv \{t\} \). Let \( t > 0 \), without loss of generality. In this sub-section, we will use \( q_t(n) \) to denote the RSE for type \( t \) and the sample size \( n \), in order to highlight the role of \( n \). It is uniquely given by

\[
q_t(n) = \Phi \left( t \sqrt{nq_t(n)(1-q_t(n))} \right)
\]  

Our task is to analyze the dependence of \( q_t(n) \) on \( n \), especially in comparison with uniform sampling.

First, observe that \( q_t(n) \) increases with \( n \), by the same logic as Remark 2. The next result shows that choice errors vanish as \( n \) tends to infinity.

**Proposition 2** \( \lim_{n \to \infty} q_t(n) = 1 \).

**Proof.** Assume the contrary — i.e., there exists \( q^* < 1 \) such that for every \( n > 0 \), there exists \( n' > n \) such that \( q_t(n') < q^* \). Recall that \( q_t(n') > \frac{1}{2} \). Therefore, for all such \( n' \),

\[
q_t(n')(1 - q_t(n')) > q^*(1 - q^*)
\]

Consequently, \( \sqrt{n'q_t(n')(1-q_t(n'))} \) diverges with \( n' \), which implies that, from some point onward,

\[
\Phi \left( t \sqrt{n'q_t(n')(1-q_t(n'))} \right) > q^*
\]
a contradiction. □

Now compare (4) with the case of a uniform sample, where each alternative is sampled $\frac{n}{2}$ times. In this case, the probability of choosing $B$ is given by

$$r_t = \Phi \left( \frac{t}{2} \frac{1}{n^2} \right)$$

This can be viewed as a normal approximation of Osborne and Rubinstein’s (1998) $S(K)$ procedure, mentioned in the Introduction.

Formula (6) has two noteworthy features. First, it lacks the equilibrium effect that arises from the representative sample assumption. Second, since $\sqrt{q(1-q)} < \frac{1}{2}$ for any $q \in (0, 1)$, $r_t$ assigns higher probability to the favored alternative than any RSE value of $q_t$, for any type $t$.

Of course, $r_t$ increases with $n$ and converges to one as $n \to \infty$. However, $r_t$ differs from $q_t$ in the *speed* of convergence. Our next result demonstrates that $q_t(n)$ increases much more slowly than $r_t(n)$. For convenience, we fix $t = 1$; this is without loss of generality.

**Proposition 3** For every $k > 0$, there exists $n(k)$ such that for every integer $n \geq n(k)$,

$$q_1(n) \leq \Phi \left( \frac{1}{2} n^k \right)$$

**Proof.** We will prove that for all $k > 0$,

$$q_1(n) \leq \Phi(n^k)$$

from some $n(k)$ onward. The general claim follows immediately with a suitable change of $n(k)$.

Let $n, k > 0$. Denote $x = q_1(n)$. That is, $x$ is the unique solution to

$$x = \Phi \left( \sqrt{n x (1 - x)} \right)$$
Assume \( x > \Phi(n^k) \). Since \( \Phi \) is monotonically increasing, \( \sqrt{n x(1 - x)} > n^k \) or, equivalently,
\[
x(1 - x) > n^{2k - 1}
\] (7)

The contradiction is immediate for \( k \geq \frac{1}{2} \). Henceforth, we assume \( k < \frac{1}{2} \).

Let \( f(x) = x(1 - x) \). The function \( f \) is invertible for \( x \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \) with \( f^{-1} : [0, \frac{1}{4}] \to [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \) given by \( f^{-1}(x) = \frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - 4x}}{2} \). The inequality (7) implies \( 0 < n^{2k - 1} < \frac{1}{4} \) and, since \( f \) is strictly decreasing, also implies,
\[
X < f^{-1}(n^{2k - 1}) = \frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k - 1}}}{2}
\]

Thus,
\[
\Phi(n^k) < x < \frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k - 1}}}{2}
\]

Hence, it suffices to show that from some \( n \) onward,
\[
\Phi(n^k) \geq \frac{1 + \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k - 1}}}{2}
\]

By the Chernoff bound for the normal distribution (e.g., see Boucheron et al. (2013)),
\[
1 - \Phi(x) \leq e^{-\frac{x^2}{2}}
\] (8)

for all \( x > 0 \). Thus,
\[
\Phi(n^k) \geq 1 - e^{-\frac{n^{2k}}{2}}
\]

Hence, it suffices to prove
\[
e^{-\frac{n^{2k}}{2}} \leq \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k - 1}}}{2}
\] (9)

for sufficiently large \( n \). See Claim 2 in the Appendix for this proof.

In the uniform-sample case, \( r_t(n) \) increases with \( n \) like \( \Phi(\sqrt{n}) \). By comparison, in the representative sample case, \( q_t(n) \) increases with \( n \) more slowly.
than $\Phi(n^k)$ for any $k$, however small (and in particular, smaller than $\frac{1}{2}$). Thus, the equilibrium forces introduced by representative sampling have a qualitative effect on the agent’s choice behavior, even when $n$ is large.

Figure 1 illustrates this comparison for $t = 1$. Figure 1(a) focuses on the range $n < 100$, while Figure 1(b) zooms out to $n < 500$ (and also describes $\Phi(\frac{1}{2}n^{1/4})$). As we can see, the uniform-case specification exhibits fast convergence — e.g., $r_1(30) \approx 0.997$. In contrast, the RSE prediction is $q_1(30) \approx 0.925$. Considering that $t = 1$ represents an objective payoff difference of one standard deviation (recall that $\sigma = 1$), this is a significant choice error. Moreover, convergence is very slow such that from around $n = 400$, $q_1(n) < \Phi(\frac{1}{2}n^{1/4})$.

3.2 Getting Data from “Similar” Types

In many of the real-life situations that motivate our model, people do not get their data from a representative sample of the entire population, but rather from a sub-population of “similar” agents. To capture this, we introduce a new primitive into our model, in the spirit of Jehiel’s (2005) notion of analogy partitions. Let $\Pi$ be a partition of $T$, where $\Pi(t)$ denotes the partition cell that includes $t$. For some of our results, we will assume that $\Pi$ consists of “intervals” — i.e., if $\Pi(t) = \Pi(t')$ and $t < t'' < t'$, then $\Pi(t'') = \Pi(t)$. In this
case, we refer to Π as an interval partition.

The average frequency of choosing $z$ among types in $\Pi(t)$ is

$$
\bar{q}_{\Pi(t)}(z) = \frac{\sum_{t \in \Pi(t)} \mu_t q_t(z)}{\sum_{t \in \Pi(t)} \mu_t}
$$

(10)

We will occasionally use the abbreviated notation $\bar{q}_{\Pi(t)} = \bar{q}_{\Pi(t)}(B)$.

One interpretation of Π is that it captures coarse sample data. The agent tends to learn the outcome of choices by other agents who are like her, in the sense that they share certain characteristics with her. An alternative interpretation is that Π represents a particular word-of-mouth learning environment. Agents learn from the experiences of other, socially linked agents. The partition corresponds to a particular social network that consists of isolated cliques. When Π is an interval partition, a finer partition corresponds to a larger degree of homophily.

The next result establishes monotonicity of $\bar{q}_\pi$ when Π is an interval partition. Given any two cells $\pi, \pi' \in \Pi$, write $\pi' \succ \pi$ if and only if $t' > t$ for every $t \in \pi, t' \in \pi'$.

**Proposition 4** Suppose Π is an interval partition. Then, in equilibrium, $\pi \succ \pi'$ implies $\bar{q}_\pi > \bar{q}_{\pi'}$.

**Proof.** Suppose that $\pi \succ \pi'$, and assume that $\bar{q}_{\pi'} \geq \bar{q}_\pi$. As we already saw, since $t > 0$ for every $t \in T$, $q_t > \frac{1}{2}$ for every $t$ in RSE, and therefore $\bar{q}_\pi > \frac{1}{2}$.

It follows that $\bar{q}_\pi (1 - \bar{q}_\pi) \geq \bar{q}_{\pi'} (1 - \bar{q}_{\pi'})$. Since $t > t'$ for every $t \in \pi, t' \in \pi'$, it follows from (4) that $q_t > q_{t'}$ in RSE for every $t \in \pi, t' \in \pi'$, hence $\bar{q}_\pi > \bar{q}_{\pi'}$, a contradiction. □

Note that the monotonicity result applies to choice probabilities in cells of the interval partition Π, but not necessarily to choice probabilities of individual types. In particular, it is possible that $t' > t$ and yet $q_{t'} < q_t$ in the unique RSE. To see why, note that in RSE, two opposing forces shape
choice probabilities. On one hand, a higher type (which represents a greater underlying taste for \( B \)) is a force that increases the probability of choosing this alternative. On the other hand, suppose that \( \Pi(t') \succ \Pi(t) \) and \( t' \) is at the lower end of its cell while \( t \) is at the upper end of its cell. Then, \( t' \) shares its cell with higher types that imply a high \( \bar{q}_{\Pi(t')} \), whereas \( t \) shares its cell with lower types that imply a low \( \bar{q}_{\Pi(t)} \). As a result, the sample size for alternative \( A \) will be smaller for type \( t' \), which implies a noisy estimate of the payoff difference between the two alternatives. This force favors the inferior alternative \( A \), and therefore lowers the probability of choosing \( B \) for \( t' \), relative to \( t \). The net effect of these two forces is ambiguous. Of course, within a given cell, \( q_t \) increases with \( t \), as in Remark 2.

We now turn to the question of how the coarseness of the partition \( \Pi \) affects the agent’s behavior. First, we analyze the effect of splitting a partition cell into multiple sub-cells on the average behavior of types in the various sub-cells.

**Proposition 5** Consider two partitions \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \), such that \( \Pi' \) refines some cell \( T^* \) into a collection of sub-cells \( \{T^1, ..., T^m\} \). Let \( q \) and \( q' \) be the RSE under \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \). Then:

(i) If \( \bar{q}_{T^k} > \bar{q}_{T^*} \), then \( \bar{q}'_{T^k} < \bar{q}_{T^*} \).

(ii) If \( \bar{q}_{T^k} < \bar{q}_{T^*} \), then \( \bar{q}'_{T^k} > \bar{q}_{T^*} \).

**Proof.** We prove part (i); the proof of part (ii) follows the same logic. Suppose \( \bar{q}_{T^k} > \bar{q}_{T^*} \) for some \( k = 1, ..., m \). Then, since both quantities are above \( \frac{1}{2} \),

\[
\bar{q}_{T^k}(1 - \bar{q}_{T^k}) < \bar{q}_{T^*}(1 - \bar{q}_{T^*})
\]

By (4),

\[
q_t = \Phi \left( t\sqrt{n\bar{q}_{T^*}(1 - \bar{q}_{T^*})} \right)
\]

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for every \( t \in T^* \). Therefore, since \( \Phi \) is an increasing function,

\[
q_t > \Phi \left( t\sqrt{n\bar{q}_T(1 - \bar{q}_T)} \right)
\]

for every \( t \in T^* \). Taking an average over \( t \in T^k \) with respect to the conditional type distribution given \( T^k \), we obtain

\[
\bar{q}_T^k - \sum_{t \in T^k} \frac{\mu_t}{\sum_{t \in T^k} \mu_t} \Phi \left( t\sqrt{n\bar{q}_T(1 - \bar{q}_T)} \right) > 0 \tag{11}
\]

By comparison, the definition of \( q' \) requires

\[
\bar{q}'_T^k - \sum_{t \in T^k} \frac{\mu_t}{\sum_{t \in T^k} \mu_t} \Phi \left( t\sqrt{n\bar{q}'_T(1 - \bar{q}'_T)} \right) = 0 \tag{12}
\]

Since the L.H.S of (11)-(12) is an increasing function of a scalar variable (\( \bar{q}_T^k \) in the inequality, \( \bar{q}'_T^k \) in the equation), it follows that \( \bar{q}'_T^k < \bar{q}_T^k \).

To understand this result, suppose that the original partition is fully coarse, and its refinement divides it into two groups. Suppose further that under the original coarse partition, the average propensity to consume the superior alternative in group 1 is above the overall average (such that group 2 is below the average). The result says that after the refinement, the average probability of consuming the superior alternative decreases in group 1 and increases in group 2. If we think of each cell in the refined partition as a “peer group”, then the message of the result is that increased homophily (i.e., greater tendency to learn from similar types) brings the choice probabilities in extreme cells closer together.

The intuition behind this result is that when members of group 1 stop learning from the choices of members of group 2, they have fewer sample points about the inferior product, which leads to a noisier assessment and therefore a lower probability of choosing the superior product.

While the above result holds for any partitional structure, in the remain-
der of the sub-section we restrict attention to interval partitions. Our next result will make use of the following lemma (the proof is in the Appendix). Define the function

\[ H(s, x) = \Phi(sx) \]

where \( s, x > 0 \).

**Lemma 1**  If \( s < 2 \) and \( x \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \), then \( H \) is supermodular.

We now show that as long as the types in \( T \) are not too far away from zero, a finer partition leads to a higher overall probability of taking the inferior action \( A \). Denote

\[ \bar{q}(\Pi) = \sum_{t \in T} \mu_t q_t(\Pi) \]

where \( q_t(\Pi) \) is the RSE probability that type \( t \) chooses \( B \) under the partition \( \Pi \).

**Proposition 6** Suppose \( t\sqrt{n} \in (0, 2) \) for every \( t \in T \). Consider two interval partitions \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \), such that \( \Pi' \) is a refinement of \( \Pi \). Then, \( \bar{q}(\Pi') < \bar{q}(\Pi) \).

**Proof.** For notational simplicity only, we set \( n = 1 \) in what follows. Take two interval partitions \( \Pi^c \) and \( \Pi^f \), such that \( \Pi^f \) is a refinement of \( \Pi^c \). For notational simplicity, let \( q_t^f = q_t(\Pi^f) \) and \( q_t^c = q_t(\Pi^c) \).

Consider some cell \( T^* \in \Pi^c \). Denote

\[ \alpha_t = \frac{\mu_t}{\sum_{s \in T^*} \mu_s} \]

Define

\[ Q^c = \sum_{t \in T^*} \alpha_t q_t^c = \sum_{t \in T^*} \alpha_t \Phi \left( t \sqrt{Q^c (1 - Q^c)} \right) \]

This is the average equilibrium probability of choosing \( B \) among types in \( T^* \) under the partition \( \Pi^c \).
Obviously, if \( T^\ast \) is also a cell in \( \Pi^f \), then \( q^\ast_t = q^f_t \) for every \( t \in T^\ast \), hence \( Q^C = Q^f \). We now turn to the non-degenerate case, in which \( \Pi^f \) strictly refines the cell \( T^\ast \).

Let \( \beta_\pi \) be the probability of \( \pi \in \Pi^f \) conditional on \( \pi \subset T^\ast \). Denote

\[
\bar{q}_\pi = \sum_{s \in \pi} \frac{\alpha_s}{\beta_\pi} q^f_s
\]

Define

\[
Q^f = \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t q^f_t = \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t \Phi(t \sqrt{\bar{q}_{\Pi^f(t)}(1 - \bar{q}_{\Pi^f(t)})})
\]

This is the equilibrium probability of choosing \( B \) conditional on \( t \in T^\ast \) under \( \Pi^f \).

Suppose that \( Q^C \leq Q^f \). Then, since \( \sqrt{q(1 - q)} \) is strictly decreasing in \( q > \frac{1}{2} \),

\[
\sqrt{Q^C(1 - Q^C)} \geq \sqrt{Q^f(1 - Q^f)}
\]

Since \( \Phi \) is strictly increasing,

\[
Q^C = \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t \Phi(t \sqrt{Q^C(1 - Q^C)}) \geq \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t \Phi(t \sqrt{Q^f(1 - Q^f)})
\]

Denote

\[
x_\pi = \sqrt{\bar{q}_\pi(1 - \bar{q}_\pi)}
\]

The expression \( \sqrt{q(1 - q)} \) is strictly concave in \( q \). Therefore,

\[
\sqrt{Q^f(1 - Q^f)} = \sqrt{\left( \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi \bar{q}_\pi \right) \left( 1 - \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi \bar{q}_\pi \right)} > \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi \sqrt{\bar{q}_\pi(1 - \bar{q}_\pi)} = \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi x_\pi
\]

Since \( \Phi \) is strictly increasing,

\[
\sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t \Phi(t \sqrt{Q^f(1 - Q^f)}) > \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t \Phi \left( t \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi x_\pi \right) = \sum_{t \in T^\ast} \alpha_t H \left( t, \sum_{\pi \subset T^\ast} \beta_\pi x_\pi \right)
\]
By concavity of $H$ with respect to its second argument,

$$H\left(t, \sum_{\pi \subseteq T^*} \beta_{\pi} x_{\pi}\right) > \sum_{\pi \subseteq T^*} \beta_{\pi} H(t, x_{\pi})$$

for every $t$. Therefore,

$$\sum_{t \in T^*} \alpha_t H\left(t, \sum_{\pi \subseteq T^*} \beta_{\pi} x_{\pi}\right) > \sum_{t \in T^*} \sum_{\pi \subseteq T^*} \alpha_t \beta_{\pi} H(t, x_{\pi})$$

Note that $x_{\pi} \in (0, \frac{1}{3})$ for every $\pi$, by the definition of $x_{\pi}$. Furthermore, by the monotonicity result, the cells in $\Pi_f$ are ordered such that $\bar{q}_{\Pi_f(t)}$ is increasing in $t$, and hence $x_{\Pi_f(t)}$ is decreasing in $t$. By Lemma 1, $H$ is supermodular when $t < 2$. Therefore,

$$\sum_{t \in T^*} \sum_{\pi \subseteq T^*} \alpha_t \beta_{\pi} H(t, x_{\pi}) > \sum_{t \in T^*} \alpha_t H(t, x_{\Pi_f(t)}) = \sum_{t \in T^*} \alpha_t \Phi\left(t \sqrt{\bar{q}_{\Pi_f(t)}(1 - \bar{q}_{\Pi_f(t)})}\right) = Q_f$$

This inequality is a special case of a standard inequality from the literature on stochastic orderings — e.g., see Tchen (1980).\footnote{We thank Meg Meyer for the reference.} We have thus obtained $Q^c > Q^f$, a contradiction.

It follows that for every cell $T^* \in \Pi^c$, $Q^c \leq Q^f$, with a strict inequality for at least one cell. Therefore, $\bar{q}(\Pi^c) < \bar{q}(\Pi^f)$.

This result establishes that when the underlying payoff advantage of alternative $B$ is sufficiently small, a finer partition leads to a higher probability of choice mistakes. Recall our two alternative interpretations of $\Pi$. Under the “coarse data” interpretation, the result means that finer data has an adverse effect on average choice quality. Under the “homophily” interpretation, the result means that increasing the homophily of the underlying social network that agents rely on for learning leads to poorer choice on average. The question of how the coarseness of $\Pi$ affects average behavior for larger
values of $t$ remains open.

It can also be shown that under the same conditions, a finer partition has an adverse effect on average welfare. Intuitively, this is because Proposition 5 implies that refining the partition leads to a decrease (an increase) in the probability of choosing $B$ among high (low) types. Proposition 6 shows that the decrease among the high types is greater than the increase among the low types. Since the welfare effects of a change in choice probability are larger for high types (whose bias in favor of $B$ is stronger), Proposition 6 also implies an overall decrease in average welfare following the refinement.

4 A General Formulation for Games

In this section, we extend the concept of RSE from single-agent decision problems to multi-agent games, and illustrate it with the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (in the next section, we apply RSE to an infinite-horizon, overlapping-generation-like version of the game). For expository purposes, we impose strong regularity conditions, avoid using the fully notated formalism of extensive-form games, and rely on verbal exposition whenever possible.

Consider a $K$-player extensive-form game. We use $I_k$ to denote an information set at which player $k$ moves. We use $q_k$ to denote a behavioral strategy for player $k$, where $q_{k,I_k}(a)$ is the probability of playing action $a$ that $q_k$ induces at the information set $I_k$. We assume that for any strategy profile $q = (q_k)_k$, information set $I_k$ and action $a$ that is feasible for player $k$ at $I_k$, the distribution over player $k$’s payoffs conditional on playing $a$ at $I_k$ is well-defined and has finite mean and variance, denoted $m_{k,I_k,q}(a)$ and $\sigma_{k,I_k,q}(a)$. As before, $n$ denotes players’ common sample size.

These assumptions allow a straightforward extension of RSE. The player’s estimated payoff from playing $a$ at $I_k$ is

$$\hat{u}_{k,I_k,q}(a) \sim N \left( m_{k,I_k,q}(a), \frac{\sigma_{k,I_k,q}^2(a)}{nq_{k,I_k}(a)} \right)$$
As in previous sections, whenever \( q_{k,I_k}(a) = 0 \), we treat \( \hat{u}_{k,I_k,q}(a) \) as a well-defined random variable satisfying \( \Pr(\hat{u}_{k,I_k,q}(a) \leq c) = \frac{1}{2} \) for every \( c \).

**Definition 2** A strategy profile \( q \) is an RSE if for every player \( k \), every information set \( I_k \) and every action \( a \) that is feasible for player \( k \) at \( I_k \),

\[
q_{k,I_k}(a) = \Pr[\hat{u}_{k,I_k,q}(a) > \hat{u}_{k,I_k,q}(a') \text{ for every other feasible } a' \text{ at } I_k]
\]

This extended definition of RSE assumes that what players evaluate by sampling is not their extensive-game strategies, but the actions that are feasible at any given information set. This is in the spirit of behavioral rather than mixed strategies in the classical theory of extensive-form games. The definition can be extended to introduce an analogy partition of information sets, as in Section 3.2. Since our following examples do not make use of this feature, we omit it here for conciseness.

### 4.1 An Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Consider the following symmetric, simultaneous-move \( 2 \times 2 \) game. There are two players, 1 and 2. The action set for each player is \( \{0, 1\} \). Player \( i \)'s payoff function is

\[
u_i(a_1, a_2) = a_j - ca_i\]

where \( j \neq i \) and \( c < 1 \). This is a standard specification of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the strictly dominated action \( a_i = 1 \) corresponds to cooperation.

As in previous sections, our main interest in this sub-section is in the contrast between the predictions of RSE and the uniform-sample case.

**Proposition 7** The game has a unique symmetric RSE, where the probability of playing \( a = 0 \) is \( \Phi(c\sqrt{n}) \).
Proof. Let $q$ denote the RSE probability of $a = 0$. When a player draws a single sample point from an action $a$, she obtains the payoff $1 - ca$ with probability $1 - q$ and the payoff $-ca$ with probability $q$. The normal distribution that shares the mean and variance with this random variable is

$$N(1 - q - ca, q(1 - q))$$

In RSE, the player samples $a = 0$ $nq$ times and $a = 1$ $n(1 - q)$ times. Therefore, the player’s estimated gain from playing $a = 0$ is

$$\hat{u}(0) - \hat{u}(1) \sim N\left(c, \frac{q(1-q)}{n} + \frac{q(1-q)}{n(1-q)}\right) = N\left(c, \frac{1}{n}\right)$$

In RSE,

$$q = \Pr\left\{N\left(0, \frac{1}{n}\right) > -c\right\} = \Phi(c\sqrt{n})$$

This completes the proof. □

Thus, RSE uniquely predicts a positive probability of cooperation, which is below $\frac{1}{2}$ and decreases with $c$ and $n$. One might think that playing a strictly dominated action with positive probability is merely a consequence of sampling error. However, we will now see the crucial role that representative sampling plays in this result.

Specifically, compare our analysis with the uniform-sample case: a player’s estimated gain from playing $a = 0$ is

$$\hat{u}(0) - \hat{u}(1) \sim N\left(c, \frac{2r(1-r)}{n} + \frac{2r(1-r)}{n}\right) = N\left(c, \frac{4r(1-r)}{n}\right)$$

where $r$ is the probability that the player’s opponent plays $a = 0$. The equilibrium condition for this uniform-sample variant is

$$r = \Pr\left\{N\left(0, \frac{4r(1-r)}{n}\right) > -c\right\}$$

(13)
Claim 1 When $nc^2 > 8$, the unique solution of (13) is $r = 1$.

Proof. The condition (13) can be rewritten as

$$r = \Phi \left( c \sqrt{\frac{n}{4r(1-r)}} \right)$$

Applying the Chernoff bound (8), we obtain

$$r = \Phi \left( c \sqrt{\frac{n}{4r(1-r)}} \right) \geq 1 - e^{-\frac{c^2 n}{8r(1-r)}}$$

This inequality is equivalent to

$$x \leq e^{-\frac{c^2 n}{8x(1-x)}}$$

where $x = 1 - r$. Claim 3 in the Appendix establishes that when $nc^2 > 8$, this inequality fails for all $x \in (0, 1]$.

This example demonstrates once again the key role of representative sampling in two-action decision problems — specifically, its enhancement of the perceived value of objectively inferior actions. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (as in any simultaneous-move game), the distribution of a single sample point for a player’s action is given by the opponent’s mixed strategy. As this strategy becomes more skewed in favor of the objectively superior action (defection), its variance vanishes and makes the player’s assessment of the two actions more accurate. Under a uniform sample, this force eliminates the possibility of cooperative play when $n$ is not too small. The representative-sample assumption introduces a counter-force that favors the objectively inferior action (cooperation) and therefore manages to sustain it with positive equilibrium probability for any value of $n$.

Comment. Arigapudi et al. (2021) study $S(K)$ equilibria in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and their dynamic convergence properties. They show that for some range of values of $K$ and the payoff parameters, cooperation can be part of
a stable $S(K)$ equilibrium. However, if $K$ is not small enough relative to the parameters that correspond to $c$ in the present example, cooperation cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The uniform-sample version of the present model serves as a normal approximation of the analysis in Arigapudi et al. (2021), where $K = n/2$.

5 Situation-Dependent Sample Size (SDSS)

Our formulation of RSE for extensive-form games assumes that each player at any information set has a fixed “budget” of $n$ sample points, which are allocated to the actions that are available at the information set according to their equilibrium frequencies in the relevant partition cell.

However, one could argue that the total number of sample points that a player has at some information set should reflect the frequency of the partition cell that contains it. If a class of information sets is rarely visited, then it is natural to assume that there will be few observations about it. In other words, the representative-sample idea may be extended to encompass not only actions but also the situations in which they are considered.

In this section, we explore the possible implications of this idea through a specific infinite-horizon “trust” game with an overlapping-generations flavor. We show that our previous definition of RSE implies a stationary cooperation pattern, whereas a variation that assumes situation-dependent sample sizes implies positive reciprocity in equilibrium.\(^2\)

Consider the following discrete-time, infinite-horizon, sequential-move game. It will be helpful to imagine time as stretching to infinity in both directions, i.e., $t = \ldots -2, 1, 0, 1, 2, \ldots$. At every period $t$, a distinct agent, referred to as player $t$, chooses an action $a_t \in \{0, 1\}$.

\(^2\)It can be shown that a stationary equilibrium would also exist under uniform sampling.
Player \( t \)'s payoff is purely a function of \( a_t \) and \( a_{t+1} \), given by

\[
u(a_t, a_{t+1}) = a_{t+1} - ca_t
\]

where \( c < 1 \) is a constant. As in Section 4.1, this is a standard Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix: \( a_t = 1 \) means that player \( t \) decides to “put her trust” in player \( t + 1 \). This payoff function implies the following basic observation. If player \( t \) believes that \( a_{t+1} = 1 \) with probability \( p(a_t) \), then player \( t \) will weakly prefer to play \( a = 1 \) if and only if \( p(1) - p(0) \geq c \).

Players in this game have limited recall. They can only condition their action on \( m \)-truncated histories, i.e., the \( m \geq 1 \) most recent actions. Thus, the set of relevant truncated histories is \( H = \{0,1\}^m \). For every truncated history \( h = (a_{t-m}, \ldots, a_{t-1}) \), \((h, a)\) is a shorthand notation for the concatenated truncated history \( (a_{t-m+1}, \ldots, a_{t-1}, a) \). A behavioral strategy for any player \( t \) in this game is a function \( f : H \to [0,1] \), where \( f(h) \) is the probability that \( a_t = 1 \) given the truncated history \( h \).

**Benchmark: Nash equilibrium**

As usual, this game has a Nash equilibrium in which every player chooses \( a = 0 \) after every history. This is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium if we impose the following refinement: player \( t \)'s equilibrium strategy conditions on an action in her truncated history only when she believes that this action affects the behavior of player \( t + 1 \).

The reason is as follows. Fix a candidate Nash equilibrium. Define \( m^* \leq m \) as the effective recall associated with this equilibrium — i.e., there is a player \( t \) who conditions her behavior on \( a_{t-m^*} \), and there is no \( m' > m^* \) for which this is the case. Suppose \( m^* > 0 \), and consider player \( t \)'s reasoning. By the definition of \( m^* \), this player knows that player \( t + 1 \) will not condition her behavior on \( a_{t-m^*} \). By the refinement, she will not condition her own behavior on \( a_{t-m^*} \), contradicting the definition of \( m^* \). It follows that \( m^* = 0 \), which means that players never condition their

\[^3\text{This refinement is consistent with the idea that players prefer not to use complex strategies unless they have a strict benefit from doing so, as in Rubinstein (1986).}\]
behavior on the history. This makes \( a = 0 \) a best-reply for each player.

The game also has symmetric Nash equilibria in which players cooperate. For instance, every \( f \) that satisfies \( f(h, 1) - f(h, 0) = c \) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, because players are always indifferent between the two actions. The function \( f(h) = c a_{t-m} \cdots a_{t-1} \) is another symmetric Nash equilibrium that exhibits some cooperation. These equilibria violate the criterion that players condition on a past action only when they believe it is relevant for predicting future behavior.

For the remainder of the section, we assume \( m = 2 \) and present our results for this case only. Whether they can be extended to any \( m > 2 \) is an open problem.

### 5.1 RSE in the Trust Game

Let us see how RSE can be applied to this setting. A player’s information set is the truncated history \( h \). When a player acts at the history \( h \), she obtains a total of \( n \) observations, and allocates them into observations about what happens after the histories \( (h, 1) \) and \( (h, 0) \), with representative proportions. That is, she obtains \( n \cdot f(h) \) independent draws from the Bernoulli distribution whose success rate is \( f(h, 1) \), and \( n \cdot (1 - f(h)) \) independent draws from the Bernoulli distribution whose success rate is \( f(h, 0) \). Our normal approximation of this description means that the player’s assessment of the probability that a player’s immediate successor cooperates after she herself plays \( a = 1 \) at \( h \) is

\[
\hat{f}(h, 1) \sim N \left( f(h, 1), \frac{f(h, 1)(1 - f(h, 1))}{n f(h)} \right)
\]
Likewise, the player’s assessment of the probability that a player’s immediate successor cooperates after she herself plays $a = 0$ at $h$ is

$$\hat{f}(h, 0) \sim N \left( f(h, 0), \frac{f(h, 0)(1 - f(h, 0))}{n(1 - f(h))} \right)$$

(15)

The player will weakly prefer to play $a = 1$ if and only if $\hat{f}(h, 1) - \hat{f}(h, 0) \geq c$. Therefore, in RSE, $f(h)$ is equal to

$$\Pr \left[ N \left( f(h, 1) - f(h, 0), \frac{f(h, 1)(1 - f(h, 1))}{nf(h)} + \frac{f(h, 0)(1 - f(h, 0))}{n(1 - f(h))} \right) > c \right]$$

Equivalently, this can be written as

$$f(h) = \Phi \left( \frac{\sqrt{n}(f(h, 1) - f(h, 0) - c)}{\sqrt{f(h, 1)(1 - f(h, 1)) + f(h, 0)(1 - f(h, 0))}} \right)$$

(16)

Let us guess a stationary RSE, in which $f(h) = b$ for every $h$. Then, equilibrium is unique and given by:

$$b = 1 - \Phi(c\sqrt{n})$$

This coincides with the RSE in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma that we studied in Section 4.1. We will proceed to show that it is the unique RSE in the present setting. The result makes use of the following lemma, which is proved in the Appendix.

**Lemma 2** Fix $f(h, 1), f(h, 0) \in (0, 1)$. Then, there is a unique $f(h)$ that solves equation (16).

**Proposition 8** Let $m = 2$. Then, the stationary equilibrium is the unique RSE.
Proof. Lemma 2 establishes that there is a unique $f(h)$ solution to (16) for any given $f(h, 1)$ and $f(h, 0)$. By definition, these two objects do not depend on $a_{t-m}$ (i.e., the earliest action in player $t$’s truncated history). Then, this property necessarily extends to $f(h)$. When $m = 2$, this means that in RSE, $f(h)$ is purely a function of the most recent action — i.e., $f(a_{t-2}, a_{t-1})$ is constant in $a_{t-2}$.

Accordingly, let $f_a$ denote the equilibrium probability that $a_t = 1$ conditional on $a_{t-1} = a$. In addition, denote $x(a) = \hat{f}(a, 1) - \hat{f}(a, 0)$. Then,

$$
x(1) \sim N \left( f_1 - f_0, \frac{1}{n} \left( 1 - f_1 + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{(1 - f_i)} \right) \right)
$$

$$
x(0) \sim N \left( f_1 - f_0, \frac{1}{n} \left( \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{f_0} + f_0 \right) \right)
$$

Recall that

$$
f_a = \Pr(x(a) \geq c)
$$

Suppose $f_1 - f_0 > c$. Then, $f_1, f_0 > \frac{1}{2}$. Since $x(1)$ and $x(0)$ have the same mean which is above $c$, $f_1 > f_0$ only if the variance of $x(1)$ is lower than the variance of $x(0)$. Therefore,

$$
1 - f_1 + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{(1 - f_i)} < \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{f_0} + f_0
$$

Using the fact that $f_1 > f_0 > \frac{1}{2}$, we obtain

$$
\frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{f_0} + f_0 < \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{f_0} + f_0 = 1
$$

$$
1 - f_1 + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{(1 - f_i)} > 1 - f_1 + \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{(1 - f_i)} = 1
$$

a contradiction.

Now suppose $f_1 - f_0 < 0$. Then, $f_1, f_0 < \frac{1}{2}$. Since $x(1)$ and $x(0)$ have the same mean which is below $c$, $f_1 < f_0$ only if the variance of $x(1)$ is lower
than the variance of $x(0)$. Therefore,

$$1 - f_1 + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{1 - f_1} < \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{f_0} + f_0$$

Since $f_1 < f_0 < \frac{1}{2}$, it follows that $f_1(1 - f_1) < f_0(1 - f_0)$, and we obtain a contradiction.

Finally, suppose $0 < f_1 - f_0 < c$. Then, $f_1, f_0 < \frac{1}{2}$. Since $x(1)$ and $x(0)$ have the same mean which is below $c$, $f_1 > f_0$ only if the variance of $x(1)$ is larger than the variance of $x(0)$. Therefore,

$$1 - f_1 + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{1 - f_1} > \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{f_0} + f_0$$

Since $f_0 < f_1 < \frac{1}{2}$, $f_0(1 - f_0) < f_1(1 - f_1)$, and we obtain a contradiction.

We have thus ruled out all possibilities of $f_1 \neq f_0$.

Thus, RSE allows for cooperative behavior in the infinite-horizon trust game with $m = 2$, as a result of sampling errors — just as in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma of Section 4.1. However, it does not allow for any non-stationary patterns.

### 5.2 Emergent Reciprocity under SDSS

To introduce SDSS, note that a behavioral strategy $f$ induces a discrete-time Markov process, in which the set of states is the set of truncated histories $H$. The probabilities of transition from $h \in H$ into the concatenated truncated histories $(h, 1)$ and $(h, 0)$ are $f(h)$ and $1 - f(h)$, respectively. If $f(h) \in (0, 1)$ for every $h$ — i.e., $f$ has full support — then the Markov process is irreducible and therefore has a unique invariant distribution over $H$, denoted $\alpha_f$. Moreover, this distribution has full support.

For every $h \in H$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$, define the following independently
distributed, normal random variable:

\[ \hat{f}(h, a) \sim N \left( f(h, a), \frac{f(h, a)(1 - f(h, a))}{n \alpha_f(h, a)} \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (17)

This variable represents a player’s estimate of the probability that the subsequent player will choose \( a = 1 \) following the truncated history \((h, a)\). This is the same as (14)-(15), except that the number of observations about \((h, a)\) is \(n\alpha_f(h, a)\). This captures the idea that the representation of a situation in the sample is proportional to the frequency with which it is visited.

**Definition 3 (Situation-dependent RSE)** A full-support strategy \( f \) is a situation-dependent RSE if, for every \( h \in H \),

\[ f(h) = \Pr(\hat{f}(h, 1) - \hat{f}(h, 0) \geq c) \]  \hspace{1cm} (18)

where \( \hat{f} \) is defined by (17).

The following result shows that unlike the original definition of RSE, situation-dependent RSE involves non-stationary strategies. In particular, it implies positive reciprocity.

**Proposition 9** Let \( m = 2 \). In any situation-dependent RSE, \( f(a_{t-2}, a_{t-1}) \) is strictly increasing in \( a_{t-1} \).

**Proof.** The argument that \( f \) is effectively a function of the most recent action, established in the proof of Proposition 8, holds here, too. Accordingly, we denote by \( f_a \) the probability that \( a_{t+1} = 1 \) conditional on \( a_t = a \). In a similar vein, we use the notation \( \alpha_h \) for \( \alpha_f(h) \). Then, condition (18) can be written as

\[ f_1 = \Pr(\hat{f}(1, 1) - \hat{f}(1, 0) \geq c) \]
\[ f_0 = \Pr(\hat{f}(0, 1) - \hat{f}(0, 0) \geq c) \]
where

$$\hat{f}(1, 1) - \hat{f}(1, 0) \sim N\left( f_1 - f_0, \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{na_{11}} + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{na_{10}} \right)$$

$$\hat{f}(0, 1) - \hat{f}(0, 0) \sim N\left( f_1 - f_0, \frac{f_1(1 - f_1)}{na_{01}} + \frac{f_0(1 - f_0)}{na_{00}} \right)$$

By the definition of \( \alpha_f \),

$$\alpha_{11} = f_1 \cdot (\alpha_{11} + \alpha_{01})$$
$$\alpha_{10} = (1 - f_1) \cdot (\alpha_{11} + \alpha_{01})$$
$$\alpha_{01} = f_0 \cdot (\alpha_{10} + \alpha_{00})$$
$$\alpha_{00} = (1 - f_0) \cdot (\alpha_{10} + \alpha_{00})$$
$$1 = \alpha_{00} + \alpha_{01} + \alpha_{10} + \alpha_{11}$$

The solution for \( \alpha_f \) is

$$\alpha_{11} = \frac{f_1f_0}{1 + f_0 - f_1}$$
$$\alpha_{10} = \frac{f_0(1 - f_1)}{1 + f_0 - f_1}$$
$$\alpha_{01} = \frac{f_0(1 - f_1)}{1 + f_0 - f_1}$$
$$\alpha_{00} = \frac{(1 - f_0)(1 - f_1)}{1 + f_0 - f_1}$$

If \( f_1 - f_0 \geq c \), then \( f_1 > f_0 \) and we are done. Now suppose \( f_1 - f_0 < c \).

Then, \( f_1, f_0 < \frac{1}{2} \). Therefore, \( \alpha_{11} < \alpha_{01} \) and \( \alpha_{10} < \alpha_{00} \). It follows that \( \hat{f}(1, 1) - \hat{f}(1, 0) \) and \( \hat{f}(0, 1) - \hat{f}(0, 0) \) have the same mean, and

$$Var(\hat{f}(0, 1) - \hat{f}(0, 0)) < Var(\hat{f}(1, 1) - \hat{f}(1, 0))$$

Since the mean lies below \( c \),

$$f_1 = Pr(\hat{f}(1, 1) - \hat{f}(1, 0) \geq c) > Pr(\hat{f}(0, 1) - \hat{f}(0, 0) \geq c) = f_0$$

This completes the proof. ■
The message of this result is that reciprocity emerges naturally when players form beliefs on the basis of representative samples, where representativeness extends to the truncated histories at which they evaluate actions.

To see the logic behind this result, note that in equilibrium, one of the two actions is objectively better for all players, regardless of the history. Indeed, if \( f_1 - f_0 < c \) (\( > c \)), defection (cooperation) is strictly better. Furthermore, the inferior action will be played with frequency below 50% after any truncated history — just as alternative \( A \) was chosen with probability below \( \frac{1}{2} \) in the binary choice model. To fix ideas, assume cooperation \( (a = 1) \) is the inferior action. Then, since cooperation is less frequent than defection, agents will have fewer observations about what happens after the truncated history \( (h, 1) \) compared to the history \( (h, 0) \). This means that their payoff estimates following \( (h, 1) \) will be noisier, leading them to choose the inferior action \( a = 1 \) with higher probability after \( (h, 1) \) than after \( (h, 0) \). The same logic holds if defection is the inferior action. (While it seems plausible that \( a = 1 \) should be the inferior action — indeed, this is supported by numerical simulations we have carried out, the results of which are presented in Figure 2 — we have been unable to prove this so far.)

Figure 2
Unlike the reciprocity patterns admitted by Nash equilibrium, those that are implied by situation-dependent RSE are a lot more specific. We do not know whether situation-dependent RSE is unique, but our numerical simulations suggest that it is. They also give a sense of the magnitude of cooperation in the trust game for various values of $c$ and $n$. Furthermore, RSE satisfies the criterion that players condition on a past action only when they believe it is relevant for predicting their opponent’s behavior.

Situation-dependent RSE takes us further away from the “active experimentation” image behind $S(K)$ equilibrium and brings us closer to a sampling-based equilibrium concept in which sample data is observational in nature.

6 Conclusion

This paper conveyed three basic ideas. First, it took the sampling-based equilibrium approach and modified its implicit “active experimentation” learning mode into a more passive format, which better fits situations in which players learn from observational data generated by their equilibrium behavior.

Second, the concept of RSE introduces two modeling approximations — representative samples and Gaussian approximations — which enhance the tractability of sampling-based equilibrium analysis and facilitate its extension to complex games.

Finally, the key equilibrium force that our paper highlighted is the effect of endogenous sample size on the variance of players’ assessments of their actions. A skewed distribution over actions generates noisy estimates of their payoff differences, which favors the objectively inferior actions and thus moderates the distribution’s skewness. This force drives new strategic effects, such as the slow convergence of equilibrium behavior toward the rational benchmark in binary choice models, or the play of dominated actions in $2 \times 2$ games.
Appendix: Missing Proofs

Claim 2 For every sufficiently large $n$,

$$e^{-\frac{nk}{2}} \leq \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k-1}}}{2}$$

Proof. Define

$$h(n) = \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k-1}}}{2} - e^{-\frac{nk}{2}}$$

Note that (since $k < \frac{1}{2}$) $\lim_{n \to \infty} h(n) = 0$. Thus, it suffices to prove that there exists $n(k)$ such that for all $n \geq n(k)$, $h'(n) < 0$. This will imply $h(n) \geq 0$ for all $n \geq n(k)$ and thus that (9) holds for all such $n$. We have

$$h'(n) = \frac{(2k-1)n^{2k-2}}{\sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k-1}}} + kn^{2k-1}e^{-\frac{nk}{2}}$$

Therefore, $h'(n) < 0$ if and only if

$$\frac{e^{\frac{nk}{2}}}{n\sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k-1}}} > \frac{k}{1 - 2k}$$

Successive applications of L'Hôpital's rule imply

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{e^{\frac{nk}{2}}}{n\sqrt{1 - 4n^{2k-1}}} = \infty$$

which completes the proof. ■

Proof of Lemma 1

Recall that

$$H(s, x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{sx} e^{-\frac{a^2}{2}} da$$
Let us calculate the cross derivative of $H$. First,
\[
\frac{\partial H(s, x)}{\partial s} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot x \cdot e^{-\frac{1}{2} s^2 x^2}
\]
Now differentiate this expression with respect to $x$:
\[
\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \left[ e^{-\frac{1}{2} s^2 x^2} - \frac{s^2}{2} \cdot 2x \cdot x \cdot e^{-\frac{1}{2} s^2 x^2} \right]
\]
When $x < \frac{1}{2}$, this expression is strictly positive whenever $s < 2$. ■

Claim 3 If $x \in (0, 1]$ and $nc^2 > 8$, then $x > e^{-\frac{c^2 n}{4x(1-x)}}$.

Proof. Denote $t = c^2 n$ and define
\[
f(x, t) = x - e^{-\frac{t}{2x(1-x)}}
\]
Note that for all $x > 0$, $f(x, t)$ is increasing in $t$ for $t > 0$. Thus, it suffices to prove that $f(x, 8) > 0$ for all $x \in (0, 1]$. For all such $x$ we have $x > x(1-x) > 0$ and hence,
\[
f(x, 8) = x - e^{-\frac{1}{2x(1-x)}} > x - e^{-\frac{1}{x}}
\]
The R.H.S can easily be shown to be strictly positive for all $x > 0$. ■

Proof of Lemma 2
Fix $f(h, 1), f(h, 0) \in (0, 1)$. Denote
\[
x = f(h)
d = \sqrt{n}(f(h, 1) - f(h, 0) - c)
a = f(h, 1)(1 - f(h, 1))
b = f(h, 0)(1 - f(h, 0))
\]
Then, equation (16) can be written as

\[ x = \Phi \left( d \sqrt{\frac{x(1-x)}{a(1-x) + bx}} \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (19)

where \( a, b \in (0, \frac{1}{4}) \), \( d \) is any real number, and \( x \in [0, 1] \).

When \( d = 0 \), \( x = \frac{1}{2} \) trivially. Suppose \( d > 0 \) (the case of \( d < 0 \) is proved in the same manner). Then, the candidate solutions of \( x \) in (19) lie in \([\frac{1}{2}, 1]\). Moreover, the R.H.S is above \( \frac{1}{2} \) (namely, above the L.H.S) at \( x = \frac{1}{2} \) and takes the value 0 (namely, below the L.H.S) at \( x = 1 \). In addition, the function

\[ h(x) = \frac{x(1-x)}{a(1-x) + bx} \]

is concave in \( x \). Therefore, there is some \( x^* \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \) such that \( h \) is increasing for \( x < x^* \) and decreasing for \( x > x^* \). Recall that the functions \( d \sqrt{z} \) and \( \Phi(z) \) are strictly increasing and concave for \( z, d > 0 \). Therefore, the composite function

\[ \Phi \left( d \sqrt{\frac{x(1-x)}{a(1-x) + bx}} \right) \]

is strictly increasing and concave for \( x < x^* \), and decreasing (but not necessarily concave) for \( x > x^* \). It follows that (19) has a unique solution in \((\frac{1}{2}, 1)\).

**References**


